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Abstract   Conventional methods of regulating commercial fisheries restrict
catch by limiting either the quantity or efficiency of fishing effort, or by putting
direct limits on catch. These regulatory practices are neither feasible nor desir-
able for many fisheries, and have failed to conserve fishery stocks in other
fisheries. Marine reserves may be an effective alternative management strategy
for some fisheries. Here we develop a dynamic model of marine reserves appli-
cable to inshore fisheries. In contrast to previous models of reserves, the model
is fully dynamic and provides information on both equilibrium conditions and
the path to equilibrium. A simulation model based on red snapper data from the
Gulf of Mexico is presented. The simulation results suggest that marine reserves
can sustain or increase yields for moderate to heavily fished fisheries but will
probably not improve yields for lightly fished fisheries.
Key words   Closed areas, inshore fisheries, marine protected areas, marine
reserves, reef fisheries.
Conventional methods of regulating commercial fisheries including limited licenses,
catch quotas, taxes on catch or effort, gear restrictions, and closed seasons restrict
catch by limiting either the quantity or efficiency of fishing effort, or by putting di-
rect limits on total catch (Cunningham 1983). Although widely applied, conven-
tional methods have often failed to prevent depletion or collapse of many fish
stocks. In some fisheries, due to the large number of fishers, numerous landing sites,
variety of fishing technologies, or complex interspecific interactions, these methods
of regulation are difficult and/or expensive to use (for example, see Roberts and
Polunin 1991; Holland, et al. 1995.).
Several fisheries scientists (Bohnsack 1990; Carr and Reed 1992; Davis 1989;
Roberts and Polunin 1991,1993; Sadovy 1992; Rowley 1994) have suggested that
for some fisheries, closing part of the fishery through the creation of marine re-
serves may sustain or increase harvests. Marine reserves act as a natural hatchery
and nursery in which reproduction and growth are not impeded. The populations that
develop in reserves supplement surrounding fisheries through export of larvae and
adult fish. Marine reserves may also reduce the risk of fishery collapse by maintain-
ing a more diverse age structure and genetic base.1 Reserves will likely be most ef-
fective for sustaining or increasing harvests in inshore fisheries2 in which adults are
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heavily fished populations may be reduced as the average age and average age of maturity is reduced.
2 Inshore fisheries are shallow water marine fisheries which are close to shore. Inshore fisheries include
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non-migratory residents. However reserves may be useful for other fisheries as
well.3
Marine reserves differ from conventional regulatory methods in that they close a
portion of the fishery, and do not directly attempt to reduce harvests, fishing effort,
or the efficiency of fishing effort. Although marine reserves may increase fishery
production and may reduce the probability of a collapse of the fishery, they are not
generally first-best strategies that will lead to economically efficient use of the re-
source. Marine reserves may provide a stand-alone management strategy when first-
best methods are unable to directly control effort or catch due to political or techni-
cal unfeasibility or expense. They may also be a valuable component of a multifac-
eted management policy.
Our purpose is to present a simple economic analysis of marine reserves as a
tool of fishery management. This analysis is intended to be a first step in addressing
an important omission in the literature. Previous models of marine reserves have
been yield per recruit analyses (Polacheck 1990; DeMartini 1993). These analyses
are biologically oriented, only generate information about steady-states, and omit
important economic variables such as price, interest rates, and minimum constraints
on fishery production. Empirical studies of marine reserves have focused on the
conservation benefits of habitat and organisms within the boundaries of reserves
(Bohnsack 1982; Clark, et al. 1989; Causey and Bohnsack 1989; Roberts and
Polunin).4 Rowley (1994) has compiled an extensive summary of evidence regarding
the ability of reserves to supplement surrounding fisheries, but finds that further re-
search, including simulation, will be required before firm conclusions can be drawn.
We begin with a dynamic model of a fishery in which a marine reserve is intro-
duced. In contrast to most previous economic models of fisheries, total effort is as-
sumed to be fixed. This implies that effort will not be reduced with the introduction
of a reserve and that it is possible to limit future increases in effort if rents occur
from the introduction of a reserve.5 Unlike previous models of marine reserves, the
optimal reserve size is determined by maximizing the present value of harvests over
a planning horizon, rather than by maximizing sustainable yields. Two other key dif-
ferences between this model and previous models of marine reserves are the inclu-
sion of multiple age classes and a stock recruitment relationship.6 With these inclu-
sions, the effects of changing population size and age structure on recruitment and
harvest over time can be investigated. Unlike previous models, the time paths of
harvests and fish stocks prior to reaching a steady-state are determined. The time
paths of harvests and stocks are important because the full impact of the reserve
may not be realized for several years. Consideration of the time paths also demon-
strates a new and potentially important result; that is, the optimal reserve size varies
inversely with the discount rate.
Although the dynamic model is a simplified description of the introduction of a
3 Extensive, long term area closures will be used in the groundfish fisheries off the coasts of Atlantic
Canada and New England to promote the recovery of depleted stocks (NEFMC 1996).
4 One exception is Alcala (1988). He noted the drop in harvests for a small island fishery when a small
reserve was eliminated. However, the results are not conclusive. The drop in harvests could have been
due to natural fluctuations in recruitment.
5 We assume fishing effort is fixed for simplicity. Known, exogenous shifts in fishing effort are straight-
forward to include. It is reasonable to assume that fishing effort is fixed, when total fishing effort is
regulated by other methods, or in a subsistence fishery for which the surrounding population is constant.
6 Recruitment refers to the number of juvenile fish that enter the fishery (i.e., grow to fishable size). A
stock recruitment relationship refers to recruitment as a function of the adult population of the fishery.
Polacheck (1990) underscores the need to incorporate a stock recruitment relationship.Marine Reserves for Fisheries Management 159
reserve due to the complexities of modeling age structure, unambiguous qualitative
results are scarce. To more fully investigate introducing reserves and to begin exam-
ining the potential quantitative impacts from introducing reserves, we present a nu-
merical simulation based on red snapper data from the Gulf of Mexico. Red snapper
is a species common in many inshore fisheries, and shares several characteristics
with other target species commonly found in inshore fisheries. In the simulation, op-
timal reserve size is determined under varying biological conditions and effort lev-
els. The simulation results suggest that marine reserves will sustain or increase har-
vests in heavily fished, inshore fisheries. This contrasts with previous studies that do
not incorporate a stock recruitment relationship. In these previous studies that did
not model a stock-recruitment relationship (DeMartini 1993; Polacheck 1990) ma-
rine reserves generally do not sustain or increase harvests.7 The sensitivity analysis
also illustrates the importance of key biological assumptions on results.
Model of a Marine Reserve
In this section we develop a multiple cohort fisheries model with reserve size as the
choice variable. Through a stock recruitment relationship, the model incorporates
the impacts of a reserve on recruitment and harvest over time. Recruitment, growth,
emigration, and immigration are density dependent. Harvest is a function of non-re-
serve stock, a small percentage of reserve stock assumed to be caught while forag-
ing outside the reserve, and intensity of fishing effort. The overall level of fishing
effort is assumed to be fixed, so that effort displaced from the reserve is applied to
the portion of the fishery that remains open.8 The model does not account for spatial
heterogeneity of stocks other than differences between reserve and non-reserve
stocks.
Age structure of the population in the fishery is described using modified Leslie
(1948) population matrices:9
X(t) = Zx(t – 1)X(t – 1) + Tyx(t – 1)Y(t – 1)  and (1)
Y(t) = Zy(t – 1)Y(t – 1) + Txy(t – 1)X(t – 1)
where X(t) and Y(t) are 1× n row vectors of the numbers of fish of age a at time t in
the fishery and reserve respectively, Zx(t) and Zy(t) are n× n matrices of recruitment,
emigration and survivorship from age a – 1 at time t – 1 to age a at time t in the
fishery and reserve, respectively, and Txy(t – 1) and Tyx(t – 1) are n× n matrices of
recruitment and immigration from age a – 1 at time t – 1 to age a at time t from the
other stock.
Writing the elements of vectors, X(t) and X(t – 1) and the matrices Zx(t – 1) and
Tyx(t – 1) provides a more detailed description of age structure:
7 Spawning Stock Biomass (SSB) does increase. However, without a stock recruitment relationship, this
does not impact future recruitment.
8 This is similar to the way that Polacheck (1990) modeled effort except that effort was divided by the
fraction of the incoming cohort protected by the reserve rather than the fraction of the fishery area
closed.
9 For simplicity we develop and simulate a single species model. The assumption of single species limits
the applicability of the model in multiple species fisheries. Multiple species models with interactions are
extremely intractable. Fortunately, most target species exhibit similar spatial range and reproductive
strategies. This suggests that the effects of the reserve will be similar for most of these species (Doherty





















































































































































































































































































































































where n is maximum fish age; Rxx(a, t – 1) is the rate of recruitment to the fishery at
time t provided by an age a fish in the fishery at time t – 1; Ryx(a, t – 1) is the rate of
recruitment to the fishery at time t provided by an age a fish in the reserve at time
t – 1; τ yx(t) is the net emigration rate from the reserve to the fishery at time t; x(a, t)
and y(a, t) are the number of fish age a in the fishery and reserve, respectively, at
time t; and zx(a, t – 1) is the conditional probability of an age a fish surviving in the
fishery from time t – 1 to time t.
An analogous description of the population dynamics for the reserve is de-
scribed by interchanging x’s and y’s, and defining Rxy(a, t – 1), Ryy(a, t – 1), τ xy(t),
and zy(a, t – 1).
Recruitment is a function of overall (fishery and reserve) egg production and
biomass density in the area of settlement (fishery or reserve). Recruitment is defined
as survival to age one year rather than by vulnerability to fishing gear. The recruit-
ment coefficients are specified as:
Rxx(a, t) = (1 – S)B(Dx(t))L(wx(a, t)) (2)
Ryx(a, t) = SB(Dx(t))L(wy(a, t))
where B(Dx(t)) and B(Dy(t)) are the density dependent recruitment rates for the fish-
ery and reserve respectively; Dx(t) and Dy(t) are the biomass density of the fishery
and reserve, respectively, at time t; L(w(a, t))’s are weight dependent egg/larva pro-
duction rates; S is reserve size as a percentage of the total pre-reserve fishing area;
and wx(a, t) and wy(a, t) are the weights of an age a fish in the fishery and reserve,
respectively, at time t. B(Dy(t)) is defined analogously.
Eggs and/or larvae are assumed to leave the reserve and the fishery, mix, and beMarine Reserves for Fisheries Management 161
distributed uniformly over the reserve and fishery upon return.10 The fishery and re-
serve receive proportions 1 – S and S, respectively, of total larvae but survival of those
larvae to recruitment at age 1 is dependent on local biomass density. If recruitment is
purely local, then the only interaction between the reserve and fishery will be through
emigration and immigration and the Rxy and Ryx coefficients will be zero and the Rxx and
Ryy coefficients will be multiplied by one rather than S and (1 – S) respectively.
The fishery (reserve) biomass density at time t is the total weight of the fishery











where Wx(t) and Wy(t) are n× 1 row vectors of age specific weights, wx(a, t) and
wy(a, t), respectively. Growth rates are assumed to be density dependent. That is,
fish weight is determined by age of fish and population density.11
After recruitment, the number of age a fish in the fishery (reserve) depends on
the survivorship of age a – 1 fish in the fishery (reserve) at time t – 1 plus net immi-
gration from the reserve (fishery). The hazards to survivorship are natural mortality
and fishing mortality. The conditional probability of surviving in the fishery and the
reserve from age a – 1 to age a can be decomposed into:




























  τ yx – Fy(a – 1)
E
S 1–
where E is the predetermined effort level,12 Fx(a – 1) and Fy(a – 1) are the fishing
mortality rate of fish of age a in the fishery and reserve, respectively, and Mx(a – 1)
and My(a – 1) are the natural mortality rate of fish of age a in the fishery and re-
serve, respectively.
Natural mortality is an age specific coefficient. Adults of the target species are
assumed to show high fidelity to base locations though they move within a limited
range to feed. Emigration rates are assumed to be responsive to resource limitations.
To capture these limitations we multiplied the base transfer rates τ xy and τ yx by the
ratio of the population biomass densities of the fishery and the reserve to get τ xy(t)
and τ yx(t), the emigration rates at time t. That is, the greater the relative density of
the reserve to the fishery, the lower the emigration rate from the fishery to the re-
serve, is and the higher the emigration rate from the reserve to the fishery.13
10 There is a great deal of scientific disagreement over the spatial pattern of recruitment after the larval
stage. The simulation examines the extreme cases of uniform dispersal and local recruitment. A range of
other possibilities exist which could be captured fully only in an explicitly spatial model.
11 There is limited support for density dependent growth rates (Doherty and Williams 1988). Due to an
increase in density within the reserve, density dependent growth reduces the value of the reserve; simu-
lations with density independent growth produced significantly larger optimal reserve sizes.
12 The effort level E is a multiplier on the fishing mortality rate, generally ranging from 0 to 3. It does
not represent a particular quantity of effort.
13 Using density independent emigration is a simpler alternative. In the simulation when we replaced
only density dependent emigration with density independent emigration the changes in the results were
small. When density independent emigration is combined with density independent growth, then optimal
reserve sizes and present value of harvests increase significantly.Holland and Brazee 162
Fishing mortality is a vector of age specific fishing mortality rates multiplied by
intensity of effort (a scalar) divided by the size of the fishery (proportion of the pre-
reserve fishery open to fishing).14 This implies that total effort remains constant, and
all effort displaced by the introduction of a reserve is transferred to the open fishing
area so that the intensity of effort in the area remaining open increases.15 Age spe-
cific fishing mortality allows for, but does not imply initial and continuing manage-
ment conditions that control size selectivity of catch.
The optimal reserve size maximizes the present value of harvest (PVH) weight
over the planning horizon:
















where Fx and Fy are n× n fishing mortality matrices with age specific mortality coef-
ficients Fx(a) and Fy(a) along the diagonal and zeros elsewhere, i is the discount
rate, P is fish price per unit and S is reserve size as percentage of total fishing area.
S = 1 implies that the entire area is closed to fishing. S = 0 indicates that the
reserve size is zero. Thus:
0 ≤  S < 1 (6)
The optimal reserve size depends on the initial stocks and age class structure of
the fishery and reserve. For simplicity we assume that the age structure of fish is
known, and that the initial number of fish in each age class of the fishery (reserve)
are equal to the number of fish in each age class of the fishery before imposing the
reserve multiplied by the percentage of the original fishery area the post reserve
fishery (reserve) take up.








where N0 is a vector of fish in the fishery at time 0 by age prior to introduction of
the reserve, and X0 and Y0 are vectors of the initial age class distributions for the
fishery and reserve, respectively.
The optimal reserve size is the maximum of (5) with respect to reserve size sub-
ject to the population dynamics equations (1), the reserve size constraint (6), and
initial stocks (7). Reserve size S is specified as a constant, so static optimization
methods are used. We apply the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (Kuhn-Tucker 1951).
The Lagrangian function is:
14 Effort is a scaling factor that adjusts fishing mortality to reflect changes in effort while keeping intact
the proportionality of fishing mortality rates between age classes that is consistent with the gear selec-
tivity and fishing practices in the fishery.
15 The other extreme is to assume that none of the effort displaced by the introduction of a reserve is trans-
ferred to the open fishing area. That is, total effort drops proportionally with the size of the reserve, and in-
tensity of effort is constant. Constant intensity is more likely to be true when reserves are of large absolute
size, while increased intensity is more likely with small reserves. The increased intensity assumption corre-

























+ ΘΘΘΘΘ x(t) [X(t) – Zx X(t – 1) – TyxY(t – 1)]
+ ΘΘΘΘΘ y(t) [Y(t) – Zy Y(t – 1) – TxyX(t – 1)]




















where ΘΘΘΘΘ x(t) and ΘΘΘΘΘ y(t) are vectors of multipliers that may vary over time, λ 16 is a sca-
lar multiplier, and ΦΦΦΦΦ x and ΦΦΦΦΦ y are vectors of multipliers on the initial conditions.





















t P[Wx(t)Fx X(t) + Wy(t)Fy Y(t)] • 
E
S (–) 1 2 (9)
– ΘΘΘΘΘ x(t)[ ZS
x X(t – 1) + TS
yx Y(t – 1)]
– ΘΘΘΘΘ y(t)[ ZS
y Y(t – 1) + TS
xyX(t – 1)]
+ λ  – ΦΦΦΦΦ x N0
2 1 (–) S
 + ΦΦΦΦΦ y N0
2 S
 = 0.
Expanding using equations (3) and (4), the elements of the second through nth rows
of  zS
x and  zS
y are:
zS














  – Fx(a)
E
S (–) 1 2
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  – Fy(a)
E
S (–) 1 2
The elements of TS
XY
 and  TS
YX
 are the negative of the first element of the corre-
sponding row of ZS
X and ZS
Y. The first row of the ZS
X and ZS
Y matrices are found by
differentiating the recruitment coefficients with respect to S. In addition to (9), con-
ditions (1), (6), and (7), represented by the product of the right-hand side of the con-
dition and the respective multipliers, ΘΘΘΘΘ x(t), ΘΘΘΘΘ y(t), λ , ΦΦΦΦΦ x, and ΦΦΦΦΦ y set equal to zero, are
also necessary for a maximum.
The first term of (9) is the discounted marginal revenue product of yield with
respect to reserve size. This term is always positive since the introduction of a re-
serve always increases the intensity of effort in the area open to fishing. The second
term is the loss in the value from protecting the marginal fish formerly in the fishery
16 Setting the revenues equal to zero when S = 1 implies that optimal reserve size will always be less than 1.
17 For simplicity, we assume that second-order sufficiency conditions for a maximum are satisfied.Holland and Brazee 164
and now in the reserve. The third term is the gain in the value from protecting the
marginal fish in the reserve. The fourth term is the value of the nonnegativity con-
straint for reserve size. The last two terms are the marginal values of including the
initial stock either in the fishery or reserve, respectively.
If the nonnegativity constraint is binding, then S = 0. This implies that the value
of the reserve is negative. If the marginal gain from a reserve decreases with reserve
size, then the marginal loss in value from fish in the fishery from the introduction of
a reserve exceeds the marginal gain in value from protecting some fish in a reserve
for all reserve sizes.
If the constraint is nonbinding, then 0 < S < 1, and the value of the reserve is
positive for some range. The marginal gain in value from protecting some fish in a
reserve exceeds the marginal loss in value from reducing the open area of the fish-
ery within this range.
A new and potentially important result arises from the magnitude of the interest
rate. The higher the discount rate, the greater the weight placed on the initial periods
relative to later periods. Since introduction of a reserve causes short term harvests to
fall, this implies the higher the interest rate, the smaller the optimal reserve will be.
This result can be demonstrated using standard comparative statics (Samuelson
1947; Silberberg 1990). A sketch of the proof follows from noting that the only ap-
pearance of the interest rate i in the necessary conditions is in (9). The partial de-
rivative of (9) with respect to i is negative, which is the same sign as required by the
second-order conditions of the derivative of (9) with respect to S. Applying com-
parative statics methodology then shows that optimal reserve and the interest rate
are inversely related.
Since total effort is assumed fixed, costs of fishing do not change the net
present value of harvests. Only when the discount rate is zero is the optimal steady-
state the maximum sustainable yield. This result is in the spirit of Plourde (1970).
Simulation Methodology
The purpose of the simulation is to describe the impacts of a range of effort levels
and commonly held biological assumptions on optimal reserve size and the present
value of the fishery. Key parameters include effort level, discount rate, recruitment
rates, emigration rates, and growth rates. Due to the uncertainties regarding many of
the biological parameters, the simulation results are not expected to yield accurate
quantitative data on the impacts of reserves, but are meant to illustrate implications
of different sets of plausible assumptions. The results are not meant to predict out-
comes for any specific fishery.
To simulate the age specific growth rates, natural and fishing mortality, and fe-
cundity of an inshore, reef fishery, we use data from red snapper in the Gulf of
Mexico (Goodyear 1992). Snapper are an important target species in many reef fish-
eries and have biological, behavioral, and reproductive characteristics in common
with several other important target species in reef fisheries (Bohnsack 1990). These
characteristics include: a pelagic larval stage, limited movement of adults, slow
growth, low natural mortality, and an exponential relationship between weight and
fecundity. For fisheries with these characteristics, a reserve may allow an older,
larger, and more fecund18 population to develop which by increasing recruitment
may more than compensate for fishing area lost to the reserve.
18 For many important fish species, larger fish have many, many times the eggs of smaller specimens.
For instance one 23.8 inch red snapper will produce as many eggs as 212 females of 16.4 inches
(Bohnsack 1990).Marine Reserves for Fisheries Management 165
The simulation procedure begins with a steady state population structure corre-
sponding to a particular level of fishing effort and age structure of catch and no re-
serve. A reserve is then imposed, closing a fraction of the area of the fishery. Fol-
lowing equation (1), fish are separated by age class and location inside or outside
the reserve. Following equation (2), we incorporate a compensatory, Ricker-like
stock recruitment relationship; the increase in spawning stock biomass (SSB) of the
reserve population over time is reflected in increased recruitment in both the reserve
and fishery.19 STELLA,20 a simultaneous difference equation solver, is used to de-
scribe the time path of the fishery and reserve populations and harvests. Population
and fishery dynamics are simulated until a new steady state is reached. All runs
reached a new equilibrium steady-state by year 60.
Effort levels in the simulation are multiples of a base set of age specific fishing
mortality rates taken from red snapper data from the Gulf of Mexico (Goodyear
1992). An effort level of 0.75 corresponds roughly with an instantaneous fishing
mortality, F, equal to 0.27, which is asserted to achieve maximum sustainable yield
(MSY) with controllable effort in the absence of a reserve policy (Goodyear 1992).
An effort level of 1.0 corresponds with a lightly- to moderately-fished fishery, 1.5
moderate- to heavily-fished, 2.0 heavily-fished, and 2.5 very-heavily. The 1.0 level
corresponded with the age specific fishing moralities under the management condi-
tions of the time which was open access but included size regulations.
To simulate the reserve size that maximizes the present value of harvests (PHV)
over time for different levels of effort, a grid-search procedure is used.21 Since there
is incomplete information and disagreement about some of the biological assump-
tions, the simulation was repeated with different assumptions concerning the dis-
count rate, larval mixing, recruitment, emigration, and growth.
Simulation Results
Table 1 and figure 1 show the present value of cumulative harvests (PVH) over the
60 year planning horizon, for various reserve sizes and levels of effort. The optimal
reserve size for each effort level is indicated in the last column. Values in the table
and figures are percentages of the levels achieved with a 0.75 effort level and no re-
serve. Optimal reserve sizes vary greatly with the level of fishing effort. No combi-
nation of effort level and reserve size achieves a PVH higher than the MSY (0.75)
effort level. At low to moderate initial levels of fishing effort (0.75 and 1.0) optimal
reserves sizes are negligible (0 and 0.01). At high levels of fishing effort (1.5 and
2.0) optimal reserve sizes ranges from 15% to 19% of the fishery area; PVH in-
creases by 3.6% to over 8% compared with no reserve. At a very high level of fish-
ing effort (2.5), the fishery collapses in the absence of a reserve. However, even at
this very high level of effort, the PVH of the fishery can be brought back to 75% of
the MSY level with a reserve covering 29% of the fishery. The new equilibrium
yield is nearly 95% of MSY.
If effort can be controlled, marine reserves provide little or negative benefits. At
low fishing intensities, reserves reduce fishery production, both in the short run and
19 Recruitment is deterministic. Stochastic recruitment makes interpretation of simulation results ex-
tremely difficult.
20 STELLATM is an icon based programming package developed by High Performance Systems.
21 In the grid search procedure, we first simulated PVH from equation (5) under several reserve sizes
subject to (1), (6), and (7). We then decreased the step size in the range of reserve sizes that had the
maximum PVH. We repeated the process until the optimal reserve size was reached. We used this proce-
dure rather than simulating (9) subject to (1), (6), and (7) because it avoided potential convergence
problems and was much faster.Holland and Brazee 166
long run. At the MSY level (0.75), effort reserves of 20% to 30% reduce the PVH by
6.4% to 11.1%.
Another consideration in many fisheries may be the level to which harvest falls
when the reserve area is first closed. When the fishery is a critical source of income
or sustenance for a community, a dramatic drop in harvests may not be acceptable
even if it is temporary. Thus minimum harvest may be a constraint on optimal re-
serve size. Minimum annual harvests level as a function of reserve sizes for differ-
ent effort levels are presented in table 1.22 These values are as a percentage of the
MSY annual harvest level. Annual harvests fall to these minimum levels when the
reserve is first imposed and take six to nine years to recover to levels near the new
equilibrium. As indicated in table 1, when 20% of the fishery area is closed, annual
harvests initially fall by 10% to 14% depending on effort levels.
22 An alternative to limiting reserve size is to gradually increase the reserve size over time to ensure a
minimum harvest level is maintained.
Table 1
Minimum Annual Harvest, New Equilibrium Annual Harvest, and Present Value of
Cumulative Harvest up to year 60, with Varied Reserves Sizes and Effort Levels
Reserve Optimal
Size (S) S = 0 S = 0.1 S = 0.2 S = 0.3 Reserve Size
Effort Level E = 0.75/(1 – S) Optimal S = 0
Min harvest 100 93.6 86.7 79.2 100
New equilibrium 100 97.5 93.6 89.1 100
PV harvest 100 97.3 93.6 88.9 100
Effort Level E = 1.0/(1 – S) Optimal S = 0.01
Min harvest 96.8 91.9 86.5 80.6 96.3
New equilibrium 96.8 97.0 94.1 89.5 97.0
PV harvest 96.8 95.8 93.0 88.7 96.8
Effort Level E = 1.5/(1 – S) Optimal S = 0.15
Min harvest 89.2 83.8 78.0 71.7 81.0
New equilibrium 89.2 93.0 93.2 89.4 94.3
PV harvest 89.2 91.9 92.0 90.2 92.4
Effort Level E = 2.0/(1 – S) Optimal S = 0.19
Min harvest 84.5 78.8 72.7 66.2  73.3
New equilibrium 84.5 91.3 94.9 95.9 94.9
PV harvest 84.5 89.6 91.7 91.3 91.7
E = 2.5/(1 – S)a Optimal S = 0.29
Min harvest COLLAPSE 23.0 21.1 19.4 19.5
New equilibrium COLLAPSE 90.1 94.9 94.9 95.3
PV harvest COLLAPSE 66.0 73.8 75.8 75.8
Notes: All values in the table are a percentage of the maximum value achievable with no reserve,
roughly the maximum sustainable yield. Minimum harvest occurs when the reserve is first imposed. Har-
vests recover to near new equilibrium levels within 6 to 8 years, though stabilization at the new equilibrium
takes longer. Equilibrium was reached by year 60 in all cases. A discount rate of 5% is used throughout.
a Assumes starting population approximately equal to 25% of the fishery at the 2.0 effort level with no reserve.Marine Reserves for Fisheries Management 167
Sensitivity to Economic Assumptions
When a reserve is instituted, fishery harvests initially fall as a portion of the popula-
tion is removed from the fishery. Over time harvests increase as the older, more fe-
cund population of the reserve supplements recruitment in the fishery, and some
large fish emigrate from the reserve. The higher the discount rate the more the early
losses are weighted relative to future gains. As discussed earlier, this implies that a
higher interest rate decreases the optimal reserve size. For example at the 1.5 level
of effort, the optimal reserve size falls from 18% to 0% when the discount rate is
raised from zero to 20%.23 For a zero discount rate reserve size is chosen to maxi-
mize steady-state harvest. In table 1, the rows labeled “new equilibrium” show the
harvest level (as a percentage of the MSY level) when the new equilibrium is
reached. This approximates (as the planning horizon goes to infinity) the present
value of various reserve sizes when the discount rate is zero.
Cost of fishing effort may also affect the performance of reserves. Here we as-
sume that overall fishing effort remains constant for all reserve sizes. If effort levels
drop when part of the fishery is closed, the value of reserves may be greater than our
simulation results indicate. If total fishing effort increases in a rent dissipating fash-
ion, any economic gains may be dissipated. Fishing costs may also be increased and
the value of reserves decreased, if fishers who were fishing in the closed area prior
to creation of the reserve have to travel further to fish in the unclosed area. Enforce-
ment costs, although likely to be small compared to many other methods of regula-
tion (Bohnsack 1990), will also decrease the value of reserves.
Figure 1.  Present Value of Cumulative Harvest (through year 60) for Various Reserve
Sizes and Effort Levels.  S* indicates the optimal reserve size for the respective effort levels
23 Discount rates of poor in developing countries tend to be high (Chapman 1993; Clark 1991) thus rates
of 10%, 20%, or higher may be appropriate for artisanal fishers who are typically poor. Many people
argue, however, that very low discount rates should be used to ensure preservation of resources for fu-
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Elasticity of fish prices may also impact the usefulness of reserves. If fish prices
are elastic, then both gains from increased production and early losses (to income if
not to nutritional needs of the population) will be reduced. The impact on optimal
reserve size will depend on the demand function and discount rates. To examine the
impact of demand elasticity, we introduced a linear demand curve with a slope of
–1. The impacts on value of the fishery and optimal reserve size was minimal. For
example at the 1.5 effort level with a 5% discount rate, the optimal reserve size fell
by only 1%. If prices are increasing over time, the optimal reserve size will be
higher than with constant prices. This has the same effect as lowering the discount
rate if price is increasing at a constant rate.
The value of reserves may also be affected by price schedules linked to indi-
vidual fish size. With an effort level of 1.5, average fish size decreases from 1.61 to
1.51 pounds per fish, while the catch rate of large fish, ages 8 to 10, increased
slightly due to immigration from the reserve. However, the age and size structure for
most of the catch was reduced due to the increased intensity of effort when effort
from the closed area was redistributed.
Sensitivity to Biological Assumptions
The simulation results are also sensitive to several biological assumptions. Unfortu-
nately, the population dynamics of reef fisheries are not well understood. To exam-
ine the effects of this lack of certainty on the effectiveness of reserves we vary the
assumptions of the stock recruitment relationship, the base transfer rates, and the re-
sponse of growth and transfer rates to increased biomass density.
An important assumption for the effectiveness of reserves is the connection be-
tween egg production, dispersal, and recruitment. The geographical spread of larvae
and subsequent recruitment is not well understood. However, it is clear that if larval
distribution and recruitment are more localized, many small reserves will be pre-
ferred to one large one. In the results presented we assume that larvae are uniformly
mixed throughout the reserve and fishery. With at least some spatial mixing of re-
cruitment across the fishery, results may be robust with respect to the actual geo-
graphical spread of recruits since no particular spatial designs for reserves are as-
sumed in the model. However, for the design of actual reserves, their shape and lo-
cation might be very important.
Local recruitment in which the reserve population provides recruits only for the
reserve, and the fishery for only the fishery, is the opposite of uniform mixing of
recruits. This is equivalent to replacing the elements of the first row of the Txy and
Tyx matrices in (1) with zeros. With local recruitment, reserves are not effective in
improving the PVH even with high transfer rates. However, while reserves do not
increase the productivity of the fishery, they do not decrease it much either. With an
effort level of 1.5, discount rate of 0.05, and a base transfer rate of 0.05, the PVH of
the fishery drops less than 2% (4%) with a reserve size of 10% (20%).
Assumptions regarding the response of recruitment, growth and transfer rates to
changes in localized biomass density also impact the results of the model. The initial
simulations allowed all three (recruitment, growth, and transfer) rates to vary with
localized biomass density. A subsequent simulation with an effort level of 1.5 tight-
ened the assumptions of density effects on both growth and transfer; that is, growth
and transfer were made density independent. The transfer vectors Txy(t) and Tyx(t)
were replaced by the vector of constants, Txy and Tyx.24 With density independent
24 This implies that resource limitations or crowding either do not occur or do not affect fish behavior or
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growth and density independent emigration optimal reserve sizes and harvests in-
creased, particularly at moderate and high effort levels. However, inclusion of either
density dependent growth or density dependent emigration yielded similar results to
the simulations which included both density dependent growth and density depen-
dent emigration. This implies that if both growth and emigration rates are density
independent that the reported increases in simulated optimal reserve size and PVH
are conservative.
Emigration rates were varied through changes in the rate of transfer and sensi-
tivity to relative densities. However, the impacts on the dynamic optimum reserve
size and the PVH were very small.
Conclusions
Conventional regulatory methods that depend on reducing fishing effort or regulat-
ing catch are expensive and difficult or impossible to apply effectively in many fish-
eries. Large numbers of fishers and landings sites can make monitoring very expen-
sive in many fisheries, particularly artisanal fisheries (Holland, et al. 1995). Often
the technical capabilities for stock assessment are not sufficient to determine appro-
priate effort or catch rates. In other cases, reducing effort can be politically impos-
sible. Although not a first-best solution, marine reserves provide a feasible alterna-
tive management strategy for some fisheries. The results presented support the hy-
pothesis that marine reserves can be effective in sustaining or increasing fishery
yields for moderate- to heavily-fished reef fisheries under a variety of assumptions
regarding the biological parameters. The results clearly support the use of marine re-
serves in heavily fished fisheries where effort reductions are not feasible. These re-
sults contrast with previous simulation results provided by equilibrium yield per re-
cruit models that did not incorporate age class dynamics and a stock recruitment re-
lationship.
While the results are subject to biological uncertainties, some apparently robust
conclusions are: (i) The effects of a reserve and the optimal size will vary with the
level of effort. Higher effort levels require larger reserves sizes to achieve maximum
value from the fishery. If effort levels are low, reserves will probably not improve
yields, and large reserves may significantly decrease fishery production; (ii) Initially
fishery production will fall and will take several years to recover. Thus the discount
rate of those affected as well as minimum production requirements are critical to
policy decisions about reserves. High discount rates will both lower the value of re-
serves and decrease the optimal size. Constraints on minimum production may also
limit the size of reserves; and (iii) For fisheries with extremely high levels of fishing
effort, reserves can provide insurance against collapse of the fishery. The reduction
in risk to the fishery together with existence and amenity values provided by the re-
serve add to the value of reserves and may make reserves more desirable. If enforce-
ment costs are low, and, as the analysis indicates, this insurance can be bought at
little or no cost in foregone annual harvest, reserves may prove worthwhile.
Although our results indicate that marine reserves may be useful in increasing
harvest biomass in some heavily fished fisheries, reserves by themselves cannot be
expected to maximize rents in the fishery. In fact all rents may be dissipated if effort
expands in response to higher catches. It appears that if catch or effort can be cost
effectively controlled, reserves will provide little or no benefit in terms of increased
harvest revenues. This is particularly true if regulations are effective at controlling
minimum size of fish caught.
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increased or more stable recruitment, due to an increase in SSB.25 Empirical analysis
of tropical and temperate reef fisheries indicate the reserve are effective in protect-
ing a fish stock (Roberts and Polunin 1993; Cole, et al. 1990). There is some evi-
dence, both empirical and from modeling, that reserves may increase spawning
stock biomass for groundfish such as cod and flatfish (Polacheck 1990; Cadrin, et
al. 1995; Doll 1996). It seems less likely that reserves will provide benefits for
highly migratory fish, though experience with bird sanctuaries suggest that a system
of reserves might provide some protection to these stocks.
Marine reserves have historically been created to protect biodiversity, preserve
pristine habitat, and to attract tourists. Decisions on whether to establish a reserve
have required a comparison of these benefits with the cost to fisheries in foregone
harvest. The scope for implementation of marine reserves is greatly increased, if
they can protect biodiversity and habitat while simultaneously maintaining or en-
hancing fishery production. Further investigation is needed to provide more quanti-
tative information about optimal design of reserves and to determine if reserves will
be useful for the management of selected fisheries.
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